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Irrational Rationality of Terrorism
Abstract
The present article deals with the ontological problem of applying the rational choice
frameworks to the study of terrorism. It testing the application of the rational choice to the
“old” (before the end of the Cold War) and the “new” (after the end of the Cold War)
terrorisms. It starts with analyzing the fundamentals of rationality and applies it at two
levels: the individual (actors) and group (collective) via two outlooks: tactical (short-term)
and strategic (long-term). The main argument of the article is that while the “old” terrorism
can be explained by the rational choice theory its “new” version represents a substantial
departure from rationality.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss4/5

Nalbandov: Irrational Rationality of Terrorism

Introduction
The recent increase in research on terrorism put scholars and counter-terrorism practitioners in a
quandary with no single overwhelming definition of terrorism.1 The reason for such ontological
diversity is the wish to put terrorism into the cognitive frameworks of rationality. According to a
RAND study, “The main argument favoring a rational-choice model is that, if terrorists and
terror organizations behave rationally, knowledge of their beliefs and preferences should help us
understand and predict their behavior.”2 The more rational, or predictable, the terrorists’
behavior is the easier it would be to find their true motivators and to deal with terrorism.
There have been several attempts to compartmentalize terrorism within the rational frameworks:
Caplan looked into actor-specific rationalities; Crenshaw explored the rationality of the causes of
terrorism; Kydd & Walter and Pape brought the rationality into the strategic actions of the
terrorists; Oberschall focused on the collective action theory, while Libicki researched the
rational thinking behind the terrorist’s motivations.3 With all those multiple approaches to
studies of terrorism there is a remarkable lack of the coherent and parsimonious theory of
rationality that would bring it different forms under a uniform theoretical framework.
The present article fills this gap by testing the application of the rational choice to the “old”
(before the end of the Cold War) and the “new” (after the end of the Cold War) concepts of
terrorism. While the distinction follows the time-frame consideration it is far more fundamental.
The phenomenon of “new” terrorists is not necessarily limited to suicide terrorists who had been
in existence long before the Cold War ended (the Japanese kamikaze fighters during WWII, the
Jewish resistance operatives in the wake of the State of Israel, Tamils who modernized the
suicide terror in the 20th century and many more). The most recent self-radicalized “new”
terrorists, the Boston bombers Tsarnayev brothers, had no intention to die with the intended
victims of their terrorist attacks. The difference between “old” and “new” terrorism permeates
the multi-layered categories: their goals and objectives; the targets they have and the victims they
aim to destroy; the rationales behind their radicalization; the areas where they operate and the
constituencies supporting them.
The article starts with analysis of the fundamentals of the rational choice theory and applies it at
two levels: the individual (actors) and group (collective) via two outlooks: tactical (short-term)
and strategic (long-term). The main argument of the article is that while the “old” terrorism can
1

Schmid counted up to 190 definitions of terrorism between 1930s and 1980s; Schmid, Alex P. and A.J. Jongman,
Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction, 1983).
2
Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin (eds.), “Social Science for Counterterrorism. Putting the Pieces Together,” RAND:
National Defense Research Institute (2009): 170, available at:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG849.pdf.
3
Bryan Caplan, “Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model,” The Political Economy of Terrorism
128:½ (2006): 91-107; Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13:4 (1981): 379-399;
Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31:1 (2006): 49-80;
Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97:3 (2003): 1-19;
Anthony Oberschall, “Explaining Terrorism: The Contribution of Collective Action Theory,” Sociological Theory
22:4 (2006): 26-37; Martin C. Libicki, Peter Chalk and Melanie Sisson, “Exploring Terrorist Targeting
Preferences,” RAND Corporation Monograph Series, 2007, available at:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG483.pdf.
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be explained by the rational choice theory, its “new” version represents a substantial departure
from rationality. The article ends with the premise that one-fit-all solution to terrorism cannot be
found and offers some alternatives to current counter-terrorist efforts.

Rational Conundrum of Terrorism
As a theory of human behavior, rational choice focuses on both individual and groups as actors
in two forms, “narrow” and “broad.” According to van Um, “The narrow version allows only for
action that enhances the personal utility so that individuals act purely selfishly, while a broader
version also allows for altruistic goals to be pursued.”4 On the individual level, rational choice
“…assumes that the individual is the most appropriate judge of what is best for him or her… The
individual has the freedom, as well as the responsibility, to shape his or her own life.”5 On the
group level, rational choice emphasizes “…loyalty to groups, with the consequent tendency to
evaluate actions in terms of their consequences for the group and without consideration of their
consequences for people outside the group…”6 At both levels, rational choice postulates that all
actors are utility maximizers and consistently pursue goals based on the consciously chosen
stable preferences.7 The actors are guided by the logic of expected consequences: they possess
credible information about the options available to them and chose the best ones based on their
expected utility calculation.8
The problem with applying the rational choice framework to the phenomenon of terrorism is
threefold. First, a single holistic approach is used to determine the existence or absence of
rationality, which disregards other variables beyond the objectively existing cognitive patterns.
Rationality is applied in absolute terms and the actors are considered static figures always ending
up choosing between the actions with the highest post-action expected utility values.9 In reality,
rational behavior for one actor with set value systems may be irrational for other actors under the
same circumstances due to their conflicting value systems. It is a universally accepted
assumption that “actors know what they want and can order their wants transitively.”10 The
predicament of this approach is that a more rational outcome with increased utility value may
occur on its own, or as a result of multiple interceptions of choices that may not always be
rational. Rational actors may choose irrational options that may eventually maximize their
expected utility and vice versa.

4

Eric van Um, “Discussing Concepts of Terrorist Rationality: Implications for Counter-Terrorism Policy,”
Economics of Security Working Paper 22 (2009): 9.
5
William H. Riker, “The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory,” Political Psychology 16:1 (1995): 37.
6
Herbert A. Simon, “Rationality in Political Behavior,” Political Psychology 16:1 (1995): 58.
7
Bryan D. Jones, “Bounded Rationality,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 297–321; Kristen R. Monroe
and Kristen H. Maher, “Psychology and Rational Actor Theory,” Political Psychology 16:1 (1995): 2.
8
For additional accounts of the discourse on the logics of appropriateness and expected consequentiality see the
following works; March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations (Bergen, Norway:
Universitetsforlaget, 1976); March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Free Press,
1989); March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen, Democratic Governance (New York: Free Press, 1995); James G.
March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of
International Political Order,” International Organization 52:4 (1998): 943–969.
9
John R. Oneal, “The Rationality of Decision Making During International Crises,” Polity 20:4 (1988): 601.
10
William H. Riker, “The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory,” 24.
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This theoretical quandary is best seen in altruistic suicide. The end state of actions is rational if it
fits within the specific cognitive frameworks: to die for the common good may be is a noble fit.
However, as Mises noted, “No man is qualified to declare what would make another man happier
or less discontented,” which means that the core of rationality is essentially subjective.11 On the
individual level, an example of the suicide for the public good is a soldier who daily fights the
enemy on the battlefield to ultimately survive, but suddenly decides to consciously commit a
heroic but a suicidal feat to save her fellow soldiers. Here rational terrorism would predict high
upsurge in the numbers of soldiers willing to commit suicide because of the set preferences to
save the lives of others by sacrificing one’s own. This, however, is not happening and the
rationale behind the premeditated suicide remains within the cognitive frameworks of an
individual, and her unique personal preferences.
Another problem of the holistic rational approach to terrorism comes from the multiple layers of
cognitive behavioral patterns. In the ideal world, the actors should clearly see and easily
calculate the post-action expected utility of each option. However, as Monroe and Maher
suggested, “…real people don't always operate this way, nor should they. We know that each of
us has limited…capacity to perceive, recall, interpret, and calculate…”12 Rationality is confined
by human imperfections, by their inherent inability to “perform the calculations necessary even
for a reduced set of options in a decision-making situation,” and, ultimately, by the absolute and
objective flaws imposed by the “cognitive limitations of their minds.”13
A possible explanation for the irrational behavior of the actors is the factor of identity, which
varies in different actors. Specific identity constructs force them to choose different options not
based on the objective utility calculations but on their subjectively constructed assessment of the
objective reality. The identity-based “logic of appropriateness” limits the power of rational
reasoning of the actors, forces them “to derive actions from given identities” and act “according
to the institutionalized practices of a collectivity, based on mutual, and often tacit,
understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and good.”14 Unfortunately, no data is
available on the multiplicity of layers of cognitive behavioral patterns that would explain
heroism of the soldier from the previous example. The decision to act heroically may be based
on her desire to bring victory to own group out of her specific identity or following the Christian
doctrine on self-sacrifice for the sake of the common good. On the contrary, a soldier with a
different identity—for instance, a deep believer in another Christian doctrine on suicide being a
sinful act (depending on individual interpretations of the scriptures)— may wish to abstain from
taking such a step.
Finally, the “weak” rationality fails when the actors are confronted by time-relative constrains.
Rationality may or may not be present in immediate decision making: what may be rational in an
instant may turn irrational, and vice versa if the actors take time for rational re-thinking of their
11

Mises, Ludwig von, Human Action (Chicago: Contemporary Books, Inc., 1966), 19.
Kristen R. Monroe and Kristen H. Maher, “Psychology and Rational Actor Theory,” Political Psychology 16:1
(1995): 1-21.
13
Bryan D. Jones, “Bounded Rationality,” 306; Herbert A. Simon, “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of
Psychology with Political Science,” 293-304.
14
Kjell Goldmann, “Appropriateness and Consequences: The Logic of Neo-Institutionalism,” Governance: An
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 18:1 (2005): 44; James G. March and Johan P.
Olsen, “The Logic of Appropriateness,” ARENA Working Papers, 04/09: 4.
12
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actions. An immediately rational action may loose its rationality under the influence of additional
variables extrinsic to the rational choice frameworks. An option that previously had the lowest
expected utility and was anticipated to remain as such may increase its utility depending on
external factors. Similarly, a step that seemed immediately irrational may acquire rational basis
provided there is enough time for re-thinking. The soldier from the previous example may
change her mind and abstain from the heroic suicidal feat if she has enough time too carefully
(i.e. rationally) weight all the pros and cons of it instead of engaging in an impulsive immediate
action. Likewise, if her extemporaneous reaction was to hold back from sacrificing her life, she
may, at some point in future or under similar circumstances, choose to die heroically and save
others. In all the instances above the preferences are not set: they are multiple and volatile
depending on individual cases.

Individual Level Rationality
When applying rational choice theory to the actions of the individual terrorists a distinction
should be made between the non-suicide and the suicide forms of terror. The non-suicide, or
“survivalist” terrorism, was mostly characteristic of “old” terror, existing prior to the end of the
Cold War, such as the Basque Eucadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), Real Irish Republican Army
(RIRA), the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK), the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FLMN), the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Russian “Narodovolci” (short for the “Narodnaya Volya”), and the
“Esers” (short for “Party of Socialists–Revolutionaries”). Most of the “old” terrorists were
rational actors who wished to live through their struggle to see the results of their actions and to
share their benefits with the whole group they represented. The notion of self-sacrifice for the
greater common good was absent in the selfish rationality of the “old” terrorists. In addition to
having survivalist reasons, the “old” terrorist directed their goals toward attaining tangible
benefits: at minimum wider autonomy for their kin or sovereignty and independence, at
maximum. These goals were limited in scope, geographic coverage, and usually concerned
terrorists themselves.
The goals of the “new” terrorists, who appeared after the collapse of the bipolar system in early
1990s, are transnational in reach and limited in their long-lasting effects. On the individual level,
the terrorist who sacrifice her live “hope[s] to achieve infinite bliss in heaven.”15 At first glance,
she can, indeed, be considered as “an agent who accepts certain death in order to kill with high
probability.”16 Similar to traditional terrorists, she would make relative cost calculations, which,
in Sandler’s words, “…must demonstrate that the utility associated with the suicidal mission is at
least as large as the utility of the status quo.”17 This can be possible, as Caplan rightly noted,
“…if you genuinely believe that death in a jihad brings infinite reward,” which makes “new”
terrorism seem rational.18
Rational approach in decision making assumes the post-action utility to be higher, or, at least, not
lower than the pre-action one. The key here is that both these utilities should be easy to calculate
15

Tyler Cowen, “Terrorism as Theater: Analysis and Policy Implications,” Public Choice 128:½ (2006): 238.
Mark Harrison, “An Economist Looks at Suicide Terrorism,” World Economics 7:4 (2006): 1.
17
Todd Sandler, “Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism,” World Economy 26:6 (2003): 785.
18
Bryan Caplan, “Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model,” 98.
16
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in tangible terms. The thought of exchanging individual lives for a greater common good is quite
problematic to accept since sacrificing one’s life for the unknown and, thus, the unquantifiable
outcome, is far from being rational. Even if the person believes that her post-action utility from
the suicide attack would be higher than her pre-action one she still cannot calculate the true value
of the former. On the tactical level, the terrorists committing suicide attacks remain in absentia
of the results of their actions. They die without comparing (in rational terms) their post-action
utility with pre-action one. After all, no one had ever returned from the “other world” with the
message that life after death is better or worse than life itself. In sum, there is no way to credibly
quantify the individual utility in life and death: the suicide bombers might “go straight to
paradise and enjoy the company of seventy-two virgins” or they might end up in hell (assuming
that former is unarguably “better” than latter).19
Separate consideration should be given to the religion-based rationality. To start with, religion
acts as an important motivator for human actions. Those who consider themselves true believers
have the value-systems different from those who view themselves as atheists. This leads to
different cognitive frameworks of reference: what is rational for a believer (i.e. justifiable from
the point of view of post-action utility) can be as irrational for a disbeliever. Many religions have
the rational-choice frameworks imbedded in their belief systems. . The notions of “heaven”
versus “hell” are more or less present in most of the religions and the paths to either one depend
on how their followers had spent their lives. Compliance with the dogmas leads to better
existence after life and vice versa – a sinful person would face worse future after death. The
choice of the afterlife is rational as much as the person “chooses” to live in sin or in
righteousness according to different religious institutional standards.
This fact, however, does not make religion either the independent or the intervening variable
here. By their very virtues many religions are “outward” discriminatory and “inward” nondiscriminatory. This means that single religions discriminate between those on followers and
those of other faiths; discriminate between what is considered “good” or “evil” but do not
discriminate been all own believers or all own non-believers. Religious preferences are set
equally for all own actors: all “righteous” people will face the afterlife corresponding to their
earthly deeds and so will all the “sinners”. The same reasoning is applied to own followers and
those of other religions.
The problem of accepting religion as a factor-variable here is that the resulting rational choice
framework would predict that all actors-believers would normally strive to achieve the same
outcome: “Heaven” for Christians, “Nirvana” for Buddhist, “Shamayim” for the Hebrews or
“Jennah” for Muslims. If the religion is assumed to be the predominant driving force among the
“new” terrorists, another assumption should be equally true: that all believers would commit
mass acts of suicidal or non-suicidal violence in their beliefs to take the lives of all other nonbelievers. If this is the case, then Mises’s argument on the impossibility to prescribe universal
happiness fails. When all actors supposedly have equally set preferences within the frameworks
of their respective religions, this would predefine their modus operandi: killing heretics/infidels
should be omnipresent across all religious actors. However, this view fails the test of scientific
robustness and generalizability.20 Suicidal acts are still quite rare and not all the true believers in
19

Ibid, 97.
Lena, Emiliano Trizio, Thomas Nickels and William Wimsatt (eds.), “Characterizing the Robustness of

20 Soler,
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paradise randomly attack the followers of other religions: events like the St. Bartholomew’s Day
Massacre are still outliers.

Economics of New Terrorism
From a purely economic standpoint, there is conflicting evidence of lethal efficiency of “new”
terrorism. In absolute terms, suicide terrorism proves to be more efficient than its survivalist
version: according to Caplan, “[a]n average suicide attack claims anywhere from four to over
thirteen times as many victims as a non-suicide attack.”21 Pape, too, found that that, although
rare, suicide attacks account for almost half of the total human casualties for the same period.22
However, the costs imposed on the target governments by all terrorists are exponentially lower
than those of the conventional warfare. Mueller & Stewart’s study corroborate this claim,
"…annual terrorism fatality risks… are less than one in one million and therefore generally lie
within the range regulators deem safe or acceptable, requiring no further regulations, particularly
those likely to be expensive."23 Charkavorti also points out that "…terrorism alone does not
anywhere match the range of destruction caused by regular war, guerilla war and communal
riots."24 Finally, as the findings of Asthappan’s statistical analysis show, from 1981 to 2006
“…suicide bombers are killing fewer people even though more incidents are occurring.”25
In relative terms, however, the violent deaths of the so-called “hard targets”—high-level
government officials—would have significantly higher policy-altering strategic impacts on the
domestic and/or international environments than the deaths of ordinary citizens.26 Yet even here
rationality is relative: the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914 by
Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Serbian terrorist organization “Black Hand,” led to more
significant political shifts than the killing of the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 by
the LTTE, which caused no noteworthy international or regional political deviations.
Strategic Rationality
On the strategic level, i.e. long-term effects of the terrorist actions, individual terrorism may
acquire some rationality traits. Strategic rationality postulates pursuing long-term goals by the
actors. Here the distinction should be made into the actual perpetrators of terrorist attacks and the
masterminds behind them. As Etzioni claims, “It may indeed be rational (in the sense of serving
the goal) for the terrorist organizations and their leaders to send some of their recruits to die in
acts of suicide; but that does not make it rational from the viewpoint of the individual recruits.”27
Science: After the Practice Turn in Philosophy of Science,” Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 292 (2012).
21
Caplan, “Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model,” 94.
22
Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” 1-19.
23
John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Hardly Existential: Thinking Rationally About Terrorism,” Foreign Policy
(April 2, 2010), available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66186/john-mueller-and-mark-g-stewart/hardlyexistential
24
Robi Chakravorti, “Terrorism: Past, Present and Future,” Economic and Political Weekly 29:36 (1994): 2343.
25
Jibey Asthappan, “The Effectiveness of Suicide Terrorism,” Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies
5:1 (2010): 22.
26
Eli Berman, and David D. Laitin, “Hard Targets: Theory and Evidence on Suicide Attacks,” (December 2006),
available at: http://econ.ucsd.edu/~elib/Hardtargets.pdf.
27
Amitai Etzioni, “Rational Actors: Neither Mad nor M.A.D.1: The Meanings of Rationality, Rogue States and
Terrorists,” Defense & Security Analysis 26:4 (2010): 434.
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Thus, the death of a suicide bomber as a result of her attack—whether premeditated or
accidental—is not a sole variable in defining the overall rationality of the act. The factor of third
party – organizers of terrorist attacks and not their immediate perpetrators – should be also taken
into account.
Whether suicidal or survivalist, terrorist attacks usually tend to spare the lives of their organizers
and risk only those of the actual perpetrators. The leaders of various terrorist groups and factions,
according to Cowen, “…may have differing motivations than the lower-level troops. Often they
organize attacks but do not conduct them personally.”28 From that standpoint the threat of being
damaged as a result of any terrorist attacks for the individual group leaders is minimal.
According to Pape, “even if many suicide attackers are irrational or fanatical, the leadership
groups that recruit and direct them are not.”29 Finally, Neumayer and Plumper claimed that "the
leaders of terrorist groups are predominantly rational and act strategically to reach their goal of
gaining political influence on the political system of their home country."30
Group Level Rationality
Terrorism is mostly a collective endeavor with rare exceptions, such as the 2013 Boston
marathon bombers. The individual terrorism is still an “aggregation of individual decisions and
the behavior of a group can be explained with recourse to individual behavior.”31 Terrorist loners
can claim their identity affiliations with the known terrorist organizations but this does not make
them more than mere criminals in pursuit of their personal agendas. This, of course, does not
mean that self-radicalization cannot happen on the individual level. The case of the Tsarnayev
brothers is a perfect example of the terrorist identity based on the “imagined communities.”32
These terrorists had little or no contacts with the umbrella organizations and even attacked the
country that had done nothing wrong to their ethnic external homeland in Chechnya.
This brings in the following point: radicalization and political motivations are two distinct
instances of terror. For violence to be truly politically motivated it should have some sort of an
institutionalized approval by specific groups. Otherwise the counter-terrorist efforts will stumble
upon the problem of non-falsifiability. If every lone wolf choses the identity that forces her to
undertake premeditated acts of violence, then there is no political motivation as a separately
existing phenomenon. As in the Tsarnayev brothers case, the discourse on their political
motivations is futile: not only does not it yield any valuable insights into the reasons for the
terrorists attacks it also distracts the counter-terrorism efforts by taking them in the wrong
direction of organizational versus individual terror.
At the group level from the point of view of rational choice, the objective is to increase the
aggregate expected utility for the whole group. The difference is in the degree of rationality in
achieving goals by the “old” and “new” concepts of terrorism. Most of the “old” terrorist
28

Cowen, “Terrorism as Theater: Analysis and Policy Implications,” 237.
Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” 2.
30
Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plumper, “International Terrorism and the Clash of Civilizations,” British Journal of
Political Science 39:4 (2009): 712.
31
Um, “Discussing Concepts of Terrorist Rationality: Implications for Counter-Terrorism Policy,” 10.
32
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Verso: New
Edition, 2006).
29
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organizations represented and recruited from ethnically or ideologically limited circles of
supporters and strived to achieve the benefits for these groups only. This was largely due to the
specificity of their strategic objectives. Since most of them were advocating for social justice for
their respective groups, their supporters would, naturally, came from these very communities.
The embodiment of traditional terrorism, ETA was almost entirely composed of the Basque
nationals acting in Spain. Similarly, the RIRA recruits were Irish only: "unpropertied unmarried,
young men of middle classes, increasingly disproportionately dominated by urban, skilled and
socially mobile activists" throughout the world. ASALA also used to replenish its ranks among
young Armenians, and so did the PKK: according to Kalyvas, “…it would be hard to find ethnic
Turks fighting on the side of the PKK.”33 The "Narodnaya Volya" and the "Esers", too, were
composed of ethnic Russians and operated within the Russian empire only.
From a tactical standpoint, the purpose of the “old” terrorism was to impose insurmountable
human and economic costs on the opponent side to force the latter to undertake the sought policy
change.34 These goals, according to Pape, were pursued by “inflict[ing] enough pain on the
opposing society to overwhelm their interest in resisting the terrorists demands and, so, to cause
either the government to concede or the population to revolt against the government…”35 With
this, the “old” terrorism had limited goals to achieve: “to coerce a target government to change
policy, to mobilize additional recruits and financial support, or both” or “…to provoke the target
into a disproportionate response, radicalize moderates, and build support for its ambitious goals
over the long term.”36 For instance, ASALA was pressing on Turkey to acknowledge the
Armenian Genocide and eventually wanted "…to establish an independent and fully sovereign
Armenian state comprising of the Armenian Soviet Republic and Turkish Armenia" without
complete destruction of the Turkish Republic per se.37 The RIRA and ETA advocated for the
sovereignty of their respective ethnic groups - the Irish and the Basques – from the UK and
Spain, correspondingly, without complete annihilation of their enemies’ statehood or the
supranational governance of the European Union. The same limited locate can be seen in PKK’s
actions: to gain increasing political rights for their group representatives and “to form an
independent state of Kurdistan.”38 Such goals were, in principle, rationally achievable and
showed the “behavior that benefit[ed] not only an individual but also a group the individual feels
loyal to may also be considered as rational.”39
On a strategic level, the limited objectives of the “old” terrorist organization made them act very
selectively mostly aiming at “hard targets.” By doing so, the terrorists were sending a clearly
rational message to their successors: we will kill you if you continue to resist. Over 60 percent of
33

Peter Hart, “The Social Structure of the Irish Republican Army, 1916-1923,” The Historical Journal 42 (2009):
207; Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Ethnic Defection in Civil War,” Comparative Political Studies 41:8 (2008): 1043-1068.
34
Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics 27:2
(1975): 175-200.
35
Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” 4.
36
Martin C. Libicki, Peter Chalk and Melanie Sisson, “Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences,” RAND
Corporation Monograph Series (2007): 5, available at:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG483.pdf; David A. Lake, “Rational Extremism:
Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century,” Dialog-IO (2002): 26.
37
Paul Wilkinson, “Armenian Terrorism,” The World Today 39:9 (1983): 346.
38
Hatem Mukhlis, “Voting Yes to Chaos,” The New York Times (October 18, 2005): 27.
39
Um, “Discussing Concepts of Terrorist Rationality: Implications for Counter-Terrorism Policy,” 9.
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ETA's victims were the members of the Spanish police, the military, and the politicians whereas
the civilians were mainly the collateral or the "[i]nformers, drug dealers, entrepreneurs who do
not succumb to the financial extortion, people with extreme right-wing ideology, or people
involved in the “dirty war” against ETA."40 ASALA was also notorious for targeting exclusively
Turkish policymakers and mainly diplomats.41 RIRA had developed the similar pattern in their
attacks.42 The FLMN also mostly targeted the governments’ military and installations.43 The
LTTE’s preferred hits were the military, police, government officials, and the private citizens
associated with and supporting the policies of the Sri Lankan Government.44 The “Narodovolci”
and the “Esers” focused exclusively on "governor-generals, mayors, commanders of military
regiments, heads of prisons, gendarmes, high-level policemen, bailiffs, constables, judges and
prosecutors,…members of the State Duma and even the royal family."45
The “new” terrorism became a truly global enterprise: as the avant-garde of the new terrorism,
al-Qaeda recruits Muslims and coverts all over the world. It does not have a "single, uniform
recruitment process for a group; rather, there are as many recruitment processes as there are
distinct regions and nodes in which the group operates."46 Appearance of “new” terrorism also
altered the overall strategy of politically motivated violence, which made it even more dangerous
than ever. This change occurred as a result of moving away from the politically motivated
attacks to staged shows of unexpected blanket violence on the organizational and individual
levels. “New” terrorism has lost the privilege of the “exclusive club membership” and has turned
into a “franchised” tactics readily available to organized and individual actors: anyone with any
background living anywhere can be self-radicalized and commit terrorist attacks on behalf of any
organization and any cause.
Tactical Rationality
Tactically, the "new" terrorists are not engaged in the war of attrition but the war for full but less
perceivable zero-sum victory. They wish not just to change the system where they live or to
place their own policy entrepreneurs in charge: they want to destroy it completely and to
creating a new world order, the global Caliphate under Sharia law. Numerous Chechen terrorist
organizations operating in Russia replicate this idea on a smaller, regional scale in the form of
the Caucasian “Imarat,” a Chechen word for an all-Muslim political entity in the Caucasus.47
40
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The problem with such a strategy from the rational choice perspective is revealed on the level of
strategic objectives. The “new” terrorists have no points of reference to credibly evaluate the
expected utility of the proposed end state of their struggle. Al-Qaeda’s proposed global Caliphate
is related to its various historically existing forms, including the Rashidun, Umayyad, Abbasid
and the Ottoman empires. However, even those “mini-caliphates” suffered from a steady desire
of their people to move away from pure Islam and Sharia law to secularism. According to
Arnason and Stauth, "[t]he history of Islamic states appears as a long-drawn-out retreat from full
exercise of religious authority. The early caliphate…was replaced by a monarchy, which…
tended to replace the direct authority of religion with ‘group feeling and the sword’…"48 In case
of both al-Qaeda and the Chechen terrorist organizations, strategic rationality rests on their
ephemeral promise to the followers without any rational framework of reference that they would
be better off in the Global Caliphate than without it.
From the point of view of tactical rationality the “new” terrorism can be quite rational due to its
specific targeting pattern: indiscriminate violence against civilians. Due to the fact that all
terrorism, but mostly so its new version is essentially a show in need of its audience, according
to Stohl, the latter’s "… victims and all that destruction were not as important to the perpetrators
as the audience around the world that viewed that destruction."49 Crenshaw also supports this
change in wider targeting of “new” terrorists groups by saying, “The victims or objects of
terrorist attack have little intrinsic value to the terrorist group but represent a larger human
audience whose reaction the terrorists seek.”50 The change in asymmetric tactics happening all
over the world is backed up by the statistical data. A 2008 RAND study identified 3827 civilian
deaths and over 8000 injuries with only 110 military deaths and 221 injuries in al-Qaeda attacks
between 1994 and 2007.51
Instead of sending the personalized message to their targets, by attacking unknown and mostly
civilian actors, the “new” terrorists indirectly aim at the “hard targets” to instigate the political
change. This is a significant departure from the targeting modus operandi of the “old” terrorists
for whom both victims and targets were the same. The “new” terrorists’ demands are delivered
indirectly by the survivors of the attacks. In these cases and especially when the terrorist acts
touch threaten to spoil the re-election prospects, some governments tend to succumb to terrorist’s
demands. There is nothing that the democratically elected governments hate to see more than the
deaths of their innocent constituencies. To a point, such tactics can, indeed, help terrorists to
succeed. More recent examples of the tactical rationality include the withdrawal from Iraq of the
Philippines troops shortly after their truck driver was kidnapped by the extremists and removal of
the Spanish troops as a result of the pre-election promise of then Prime Minister Zapatero after
the 2004 Madrid Bombings, shortly followed by Honduras and the Dominican Republic.52 This,
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however, did not have a desired effect on the overall long-term counter-terrorist mission of the
coalition forces in Iraq.

Conclusion
The difference in applying the rational choice framework to the study of motivators and behavior
of the “old” and “new” terrorists is substantial. The rationality-based approach presupposes the
counter-terrorism efforts based on the rationality of the government actors fighting with terror.
Such an approach would be successful in case of the “old” terrorists who had clearly presented
and tangible goals. This made their behavior more or less predictable and easily to target due to
the clearly identifiable sources of threat. On the contrary, the “new” terrorists are unpredictable
in their global reach, mutating forms and vague objectives. The same counter-terrorist operations
that applied in case of the “old” terrorists—small-scale operations, such as in Ireland and the
Land of Basks, or larger military interventions, as in case of Afghanistan—are likely to fail here.
The “Global War On Terror” coined by President Bush after the September 11 attacks is a very
dangerous term from the point of view of absence of an exit strategy. The “new” terrorists are
not fighting for any specific or tangible goals. Their aim is to fight for the sake of fighting. This
is the inherent difference of “new” terrorism from its predecessor and its grave danger: absence
of clearly defined and attainable end states for the terrorists themselves. Global or even regional
caliphates and the universal Sharia rule are utopia primarily for the terrorists themselves as well
as the counter-terrorist circles.
Absence of rationality makes the “new” terrorism nothing but a fear show with the sole purpose
of sustaining further shows with the increasing number of audience around them. Success of
terrorist attacks should be measured not in term of its victims – as shown above, from purely
rational perspective the lethality rate of terrorism is very low if compared with other threats. The
United States troops may withdraw from Afghanistan but this would in no way mean the defeat
or victory for terrorists. The only way a show would end is when the audience would stop buying
tickets. The philosophical school of empiricism postulates that the world exists as long as we
acknowledging its existence.53 The world is, essentially, a combination of the matters that came
into being because of the actors’ desire to recognize them. Similarly, the “new” terrorism would
remain a threat until the counter-terrorism cycles continue to perceive it as such. Once the
audience stops paying attention to multiple tapes of caved terrorists broadcast by global
television networks, to the ephemeral jihads sporadically launched in different areas of the globe
by numerous terrorist cells and affiliates against different nations, and starts treating it as an
ordinary crime requiring relevant punishment, the pandemics of terrorism will gradually evade.
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